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Investigating International Accounting Standard Setting: 
The Black Box of IFRS 6 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of powerful entities and coalitions in shaping 
international accounting standards. Specifically, the focus is on the process by 
which the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) developed IFRS 6, 
Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources. In its Issues Paper, the IASB 
recommended that the successful efforts method be mandated for pre-production 
costs, eliminating the choice previously available between full cost and successful 
efforts methods. In spite of the endorsement of this view by a majority of the 
constituents who responded to the Issues Paper, the final outcome changed nothing, 
with choice being retained. A compelling explanation of this disparity between the 
visible inputs and outputs of the standard setting process is the existence of a “black 
box”, in which powerful extractive industries entities and coalitions covertly 
influenced the IASB to secure their own ends and ensure that the status quo was 
maintained.   
 
 
 
Keywords: IFRS 6; extractive industries; accounting standards.
 3
1. Introduction 
 
Accounting policies matter to corporations because they shape the distribution of 
income, wealth and perceptions of risks (Solomons 1978; Zeff 1978; Solomons 
1983; Willmott and Sikka 1997; Zeff 2002). It is now widely accepted that the 
development of accounting policies is a residue of political negotiations and 
bargaining amongst corporations and a political elite (Beresford 1988; Sikka et al. 
1989; Mitchell and Sikka 1993; Mitchell et al. 1994; Mitchell et al. 1998). The 
politics of accounting policymaking are given visibility by the operations of the 
standard setting bodies, which need simultaneously to accommodate diverse 
demands and also secure their own legitimacy by portraying themselves as 
pluralistic, rational and objective.  
 
With the expansion of economic globalisation, a considerable body of literature on 
accounting policymaking has focused on the processes of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), essentially a private sector standard setting 
body (Ravlic 2000; Casabona and Shoaf 2002; Zeff 2002; Brown 2004; Brown and 
Shardlow 2005; Touron 2005; Brown 2006). Some of this literature exposes issues 
relevant across sectors and industries, such as accounting for intangible assets 
(Kwok and Sharp 2005; Chalmers and Godfrey 2006), financial instruments 
(Duangploy 2007; Landsman 2007), and business combinations (Briner and 
Fulkerson 2001; Maines et al. 2004). As specialised accounting standards have also 
begun to emerge for specific industries or segments, scholars have begun to 
examine the standard setting process for banking (Jeffery 2004; Landsman 2007), 
insurance (Mansfield and Lorenz 2004; Bodurtha 2005), not-for-profit (Anon 2006; 
Kilcullen et al. 2007)  and  small-medium-sized-business sectors (Sealy-Fisher 
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2006; Woolfe 2007). This paper contributes to this literature by examining the 
processes relating to the formulation of International Financial Reporting Standard 
6 (IFRS 6) Exploration for the Evaluation for and the Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources. This standard is of particular significance to the extractive industries, 
which comprise oil, gas and mining companies.  
 
An important issue in extractive industries accounting is the way pre-production 
activities, also known as exploration and evaluation activities, are accounted for. 
Historically, there have been two methods employed, the full cost method and the 
successful efforts methodi. Under the full cost method, all acquisition, exploration, 
and drilling costs, including those relating to unsuccessful activities, may be 
capitalised and carried forward until such time as they can be written off against 
revenue from successful projects (Flory and Grossman 1978).  In contrast, under the 
successful efforts method, only those pre-production costs that relate directly to 
successful projects can be matched against revenue from the successful project 
(Katz 1985).  While both approaches are based on the historical cost concept of 
accounting, the method that produces the most favourable results depends on 
whether the reporting entity is small and in its early stages of exploration, or larger 
and more able to absorb the cost of unsuccessful efforts (Katz 1985; Van Riper 
1994).  The full cost versus successful efforts issue first became controversial in the 
United States (US) in the late 1960s when the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) sought to narrow accounting alternatives and require oil and gas 
companies to reporting according to the successful efforts method (Van Riper 
1994).  The effect on profits calculated under each method can be substantial; a 
recent switch in methods from full cost to successful efforts accounting caused one 
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UK oil producer to restate its profits from $44 million to $22 million (Neveling 
2005). 
 
The extractive industries is a sector dominated by global corporations and powerful 
extractive industries bodies whose income in many cases dwarfs the gross domestic 
product of many nation states (Cortese et al. 2009).  The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the role these powerful entities and coalitions play in shaping international 
accounting standards and recognise that their contributions may not always be 
visible but their influence certainly exists and permeates the accounting standard 
setting process. 
 
To advance the analysis, this paper is constructed in the following sections.  First, 
the black box concept is proposed as a means for understanding and examining the 
international accounting standard setting process (Hodges and Mellett 2008).  This 
is followed by a discussion of standard setting and IFRS 6, which contextualises the 
IASBii and its processes, presents an overview of the extractive industries and 
provides evidence of the enormous economic strength of this sector.  The visible 
inputs, for example the exposure draft and public comments, are examined in light 
of the visible output of the standard setting process, IFRS 6.  Concluding comments 
reflect on the disconnect between the visible input and visible output and infer the 
existence of a black box in the standard setting process within which the unseen 
influences of powerful constituents act as a countervailing force against visible 
opinion.   
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2. The black box 
 
 
Much of the extant research on accounting and the extractive industries has been 
based on the assumption that “facts” can be gained by observation of consistencies 
and causal relationships, which are then assembled into generalisable empirical 
patterns of accounting practice (Chua 1986; Mouck 1992; Hopper et al. 1995; Lodh 
and Gaffikin 1997; Agger 1998).  A multitude of investigations into accounting for 
the extractive industries emerged following the FASB’s controversial proposal in 
the late 1970s to eliminate the full cost method of accounting for pre-production 
activities and require entities to report under the successful efforts method.  Many 
of these studies examined the market effects of the proposed change in accounting 
method (Baker 1976; Amernic 1979; Collins and Dent 1979; Dyckman 1979; 
Dyckman and Smith 1979; Lawrie 1986).  Other research investigated the 
relationship between the choice of the full cost or successful efforts method and 
company characteristics such as size, age, exploration aggressiveness and/or 
success, and demand for capital (Deakin 1979; Lilien and Pastena 1981).  Research 
also attempted to predict reasons for switching between accounting methods 
(Johnson and Ramanan 1988; Nichols 1993), and tested the relationship between 
successful efforts and full cost data and company share price (Berry et al. 1985; 
Bandyopadhyay 1994; Bryant 2003; Al Jabr and Spear 2004). 
 
Given the positivist, statistics-based research that has dominated this area, there is 
space in the literature for a study of the process of setting an international 
accounting standard and the influences that shape IFRSs.  It is important that the 
process be seen as subjectively created and grounded in social and historical 
practices (Hines 1988; Walker and Robinson 1993; Miller 1994; Walker and 
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Robinson 1994).  It is important to recognise the efforts of participants within 
standard setting processes and their influence over the content of rules developed 
and also the institutional environment within which these rules are considered (Zeff 
2002; Brown 2004; Brown and Shardlow 2005; Brown 2006).   
 
Hodges and Mellett (2002) provide an example of research into the process of 
accounting standard setting.  They examined the UK standard setting process and 
raised the notion that unseen or hidden influences could also play a role in the 
standard setting process. They stressed that investigations should not be restricted to 
observable lobbying activity and public submission statements, arguing that extant 
accounting standard setting literature did not sufficiently acknowledge influences 
that were not publicly visible  (Hodges and Mellett 2002).  In a follow up to their 
2002 study, Hodges and Mellett (2005) conducted a series of interviews and found 
that there was considerable discussion between regulators and interested parties 
throughout the accounting standard setting process, much of which does not 
become part of the public domain.  This evidence of informal lobbying supported 
their earlier claims that accounting standard setting research should also consider 
the unseen influences that occur within the regulatory process (Hodges and Mellett 
2002).   
 
Hodges and Mellett (2005) use the “black box” as a metaphor for accounting 
standard setting to provide a way of making sense of the complexities of social 
interaction that permeate the standard setting process but that are difficult to 
determine through empirical investigation (Hodges and Mellett 2008).  Standard 
setters are viewed as part of an “accounting world” in which constituents and 
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lobbyists interact with the standard setting body to shape the outcome of the 
regulatory process (Hodges and Mellett 2008, 3).   
 
The economics literature suggests the regulatory capture hypothesis as a means for 
understanding how regulators are persuaded by entities to issue regulations that 
benefit the regulated (Posner 1974; Mitnick 1980; Uche 2001).  Applied in 
accounting research, Walker (1987) used regulatory capture theory to argue that the 
profession so heavily influenced the development of the Australian Accounting 
Standards Review Board (ASRB) that its research capabilities, Board membership, 
procedures, priorities and outputs could not be considered independent of the 
accounting profession it was intended to regulate.  Also recognising the relevance 
of regulatory capture theory in studies of accounting were Mitchell et al. (1994), in 
their study of accounting professionalisation, Richardson and McConomy (1992), in 
their review of potential theories of accounting regulation., and Roberts and 
Kurtenbach (1998) in their examination of CPA lobbying strength.   
 
While regulatory capture theory as proposed by Mitnick (1980) and applied by 
Walker (1987) requires direct observation, or “proof”, of the regulatory processes 
taking place (or perhaps not taking place), this level of involvement in studies of 
accounting standard setting is rarely possible.  By identifying the visible inputs to 
the process, influential forces that arise within it can be inferred to provide an 
explanation of the accounting standard that eventuates (Hodges and Mellett 2002, 
2005, 2008).  The concept of the black box permits recognition of the socially 
constructed nature of accounting standard setting and explicitly recognises that 
hidden lobbying activity that occurs, which is more pervasive than that reflected in 
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the public domain (Walker 1987; Walker and Robinson 1994; Weetman et al. 1996; 
Rahman 1998; Walker and Mack 1998; Weetman 2001; Hodges and Mellett 2002; 
Georgiou 2004, 2005).  This approach is particularly useful for the study of 
extractive industries accounting which has been a contentious and highly politicised 
issue since the FASB proposals in the 1970s (Van Riper 1994).  The black box is 
presented in Figure 1. 
*Insert Figure 1 here* 
In this conception, the black box is proposed as an explanation for a standard setting 
outcome in cases where there is no apparent connection between the visible inputs 
into the standard setting process and the output from the process.  It provides a 
space in which other unseen pressures can be considered as having influenced the 
process.  The influences that contribute to the black box may occur some time 
before the standard setting process actually begins, for example when setting the 
agenda (Cousins and Sikka 1993; Weetman 2001).  Visible influences can be found 
in public submissions made in response to exposure drafts, while unseen influences 
occur covertly as a result of “behind the scenes” lobbying by constituents and 
advocacy groups.  This type of lobbying activity is well supported in accounting 
standard setting literature (Bryant 1981; Brown 1982; Solomons 1983; Sutton 1984; 
Tutticci et al. 1994; Van Riper 1994; Walker and Robinson 1994; Weetman et al. 
1996; Hodges and Mellett 2002; Zeff 2002; Brown 2004; Georgiou 2004, 2005; 
Hodges and Mellett 2005; Cortese et al. 2009).   
 
Hodges and Mellett (2002, 2008) inferred the existence of these unseen influences 
by examining the outcome of accounting standard setting processes.  The visible 
input into the standard setting process, represented by exposure drafts, was 
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examined in conjunction with the visible output, the eventual IRFS.  If an 
inconsistency was observed or the outcome was contrary to expectations, it was 
inferred to be the result of unseen influences occurring within the standard setting 
black box (Hodges and Mellett, 2008).  The eventual IFRS may be the result of 
overt or covert influence.  Overt influence is evident when the outcome of the 
standard setting process is consistent with the explicit submissions made by 
constituents.  This implies that there was no visible opposition to the proposals and 
submissions or that any opposing players were less significant than those 
represented in the responses (Hodges and Mellett, 2008).  In contrast, an outcome 
affected by covert influence arises when unseen pressures shape the eventual 
standard such that the result is contrary to visible input and submissions.  Covert 
influence may also be a consequence of support for visible input, thereby 
reinforcing and strengthening the positions taken by visible participants (Hodges 
and Mellett, 2008).   
 
Hodges and Mellett (2008) used this framework to analyse the UK Accounting 
Standard Board’s proposal for accounting for contracts under the UK’s Private 
Finance Initiative.  They chose this example because of the significant potential 
implications from the standard and the likely controversy that would pervade the 
process of setting it.  Further, the proposed accounting treatment was to require 
contractual assets and obligations to be either on balance sheet or off balance sheet, 
which facilitated the cause and effect analysis of the black box approach.  The case 
study used by Hodges and Mellett (2008) to illustrate their understanding of the 
accounting standard setting process has similarities with the IASB’s extractive 
industries project, which is discussed in the following section.   
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3. Setting a standard for the extractive industries 
 
 
The methods of accounting for extractive activities have been the subject of debate 
for over forty years.  As noted, the US oil and gas industry was at the centre of the 
full cost versus successful efforts controversy.  Following Middle-East oil embargo 
in 1973, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given the task of 
developing accounting standards that would support the nation’s oil and gas 
industry (Flory and Grossman 1978).  The SEC subsequently delegated 
responsibility for setting the standard to the FASB, but retained the right of final 
approval (Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009).  The FASB’s exposure draft, 
Financial Accounting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies, proposed to narrow 
accounting alternatives and require use of the successful efforts method (Flory and 
Grossman 1978; Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009).  Following the release of the 
exposure draft, an intense lobbying effort was launched by the smaller, independent 
oil and gas companies that relied on the full cost method to grow their assets and 
attract investment for exploration activities (Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009).  
However, the FASB conducted studies to support its exposure draft and in 
December 1977 issued Statement No.19, Financial Accounting and Reporting by 
Oil and Gas Producing Companies, which effectively eliminated the full cost 
method for financial reporting.  Lobbying against the standard continued and in 
what has been described as one of the “most intensely politicised accounting 
arguments ever” (Van Riper 1994, 64), the SEC eventually withdrew its support for 
FASB Statement No. 19 and permitted continued use of either the full cost or 
successful efforts method (Flory and Grossman 1978; Smith 1981; Larcker and 
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Revsine 1983; Katz 1985; Van Riper 1994; Cortese et al. 2009).  The International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)’s attempt to address this issue at the 
international level marks a revisiting of this historical controversy.  
 
In 1998, the extractive industries project was added to the formal agenda of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which later became the 
IASB. The international prominence, economic influence, and divergent practices 
of the extractive industries were listed by the IASC as factors contributing to the 
importance of the project, which sought to redress the disparity in accounting 
measurement and disclosure practices prevalent in the sector (IASC 2000).  An 
internationally representative committee was established to lead the project and, in 
November 2000, the Extractive Industries Issues Paper was published.  Referring 
again to Figure 1, the Issues Paper represents the visible input into the process of 
setting an international accounting standard for the extractive industries. 
 
One of the Issues Paper chapters sought respondents’ preferences when accounting 
for pre-production activities.  As a result of the failed FASB standard, US 
companies are able to choose between the full cost and successful efforts methods 
when accounting for exploration and evaluation activities.  Companies in the UK 
and Canada may also chose between these methods, while Australian companies 
most often report under the area-of-interest method, a derivative of the successful 
efforts method.  In total, 52 constituents responded to the Issues Paper, however 
only 46 respondents commented on this issue.  Their preferences are summarised in 
Table 1.   
*Insert Table 1 here* 
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In the Issues Paper, the IASC made visible its preference for a single method of 
accounting for pre-production activities consistent with the successful efforts 
method.  As indicated in Table 1, 78 percent of respondents indicated a preference 
for the successful efforts method or its derivative, the area of interest method.  The 
remaining 22 percent of respondents argued for retention of choice between the 
successful efforts and full cost methods.  The majority of constituents arguing for 
retention of the full cost method were oil and gas companies or petroleum industry 
lobby groups.  This was consistent with the greater use of the full cost method by 
petroleum companies and their industry’s historic domination of the full cost versus 
successful efforts debate (Van Riper 1994).  The visible influences and input can be 
summarised as follows: the IASC put forward an Issues Paper indicating a 
preference for a single method of accounting for pre-production activities consistent 
with the successful efforts method, and 78 percent of public submissions 
commenting on this issue agreed with the proposal of the IASC.  Based on the 
visible inputs to the standard setting process, it would be reasonable to expect the 
issuance of an IFRS requiring successful efforts accounting.  However, the 
accounting standard, IFRS 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources, 
that was issued in 2004 and effective from 1 January 2006, did not take any position 
on the successful efforts versus full cost issue and instead permitted a continuation 
of a choice between methods.  In other words, the standard codified existing 
accounting practice for extractive industries entities and in a manner reminiscent of 
the FASB and its failed Statement No. 19, the IASB has been unable to achieve a 
narrowing of accounting alternatives for the extractive industries.  This result leads 
to the questioning of why the IASB acted, or declined to act, in this way.  The black 
box provides one explanation of this outcome as the result of covert or “unseen” 
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influences occurring behind the scenes in the standard setting process (Hodges and 
Mellett 2002; 2008).  An examination of the political and economic power of 
extractive industries entities and the relative resource dependency of the IASB lends 
weight to the inference that the IASB’s due process could be covertly influenced by 
powerful constituents.  
 
3.1 The extractive industries 
 
 
The extractive industries represent a significant share of global capital, and include 
many of the world’s largest companies such as ExxonMobil, the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group, and BP plc.  The economic strength of the major extractive industries 
companies is such that many are richer and more powerful than the states and even 
countries that seek to regulate them (Global Policy Forum 2006).  Table 2 presents 
the top twenty extractive industries companies, drawn from the Fortune 500 Top 
Global Companies list for 2006iii.   
*Insert Table 2 here* 
 
As shown in Table 2, in combination, these twenty extractive industries companies 
recorded revenues in 2005 of $2,123 trillion and profits of $211 trillion.  Comparing 
the combined revenues of these global companies with United States Gross 
Domestic Product of US$11 trillion (World Bank 2005) gives some perspective of 
the enormous economic strength of these major international entities.   
 
The political influence of this sector flows on from its economic strength.  
Extractive industries coalitions have been active lobbyists in regulatory debates 
concerning issues such as global climate change, taxation policy, and sustainable 
 15
development, with many, such as the American Petroleum Institute, formed 
specifically for the purpose of influencing public policy and regulatory processes 
for the benefit of over 400 members (American Petroleum Institute 2006).  As 
individual companies, extractive industries entities are very powerful; as a group, 
their collective strength increases exponentially.  Most of the companies that 
responded individually to the Issues Paper were also members of one or both of the 
major industry coalitions that responded: the American Petroleum Institute, and the 
Oil Industry Accounting Committee (see Table 1).  Further, instead of responding 
individually, hundreds of members companies chose to have their voice heard 
through their industry coalition.  Interestingly, both of these extremely powerful 
coalitions fervently supported the retention of choice.  
 
In terms of resource dependency, the IASB, operating under the not-for-profit 
banner of the IASC Foundation (IASCF), is financially supported by private 
contributions from chartered accounting firms and business enterprises 
internationally (IASCF 2002).  In 2006, the year IFRS 6 came into effect, the IASC 
Foundation received contributions totalling over US$16,000,000 from 283 
corporations, associations, and other institutions, including a number of the world’s 
leading multinational corporations  (IASCF 2003).  Table 3 lists mining, oil and gas 
companies, and other relevant constituents who have provided financial support to 
the IASC/IASB since the extractive industries project was initiated in 1998.   
*Insert Table 3 here* 
 
Many of the financial supporters listed in Table 3 were also respondents to the 
Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1 and are some of the world’s largest companies.  
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It is questionable whether the IASB’s funding arrangements result in democratic 
and unbiased standard setting given that the rule-maker is being financed by those it 
intends to rule.  At the very least a dependency relationship is established between 
the IASB and its benefactors which may see the marginalisation of critical issues, 
such as environmental accounting, in favour of issues that align with the 
preferences of finance providers (Brown and Shardlow 2005; Brown 2006).  
Approximately 60 percent of the IASB’s 2006 funding was received from the Big 
4iv accounting firms, making this group of benefactors a significant provider of 
financial resources to the IASB, and therefore in a  considerable position of power 
over the IASB (Carpenter and Feroz 2001).  In turn, these Big 4 firms earn part of 
their revenue from extractive industries companies in exchange for audit and 
consultancy services.   
 
In addition to the financial contributions, other resources provided by extractive 
industries companies to the IASC included personnel, with three extractive 
industries companies represented on the Steering Committee which was responsible 
for the development of the Issues Paper and the eventual IFRS.  The inclusion of 
extractive industries representatives in the accounting standard setting process is, of 
course, reasonable given the specialised training and expertise required of personnel 
such as engineers, geologists and surveyors.  However, it does provide another 
avenue through which the regulatory process is outsourced to those to be regulated.  
These layers of covert influence permeate the international accounting standard 
setting process so insidiously that they are not raised as potential reasons for 
particular outcomes, or in this case non-outcomes.  In the context of the black box, 
it is possible that the process of setting IFRS6 has been influenced by unseen 
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countervailing forces that have been of equal or greater significance than those 
represented by the written submissions.   
 
4. Concluding comments 
 
The attempts of the IASC to address the disparity in extractive industries 
accounting has provided an opportunity to revisit the successful efforts versus full 
cost debate that had plagued the sector since the 1960s when the US standard setter 
sought to eliminate full cost accounting by the oil and gas industry.  When IFRS 6 
was eventually issued by the IASB 2004, the existing and flexible accounting 
practices were not only allowed to continue, they were codified into an international 
accounting standard.  This lack of action on the part of the IASB was in contrast to 
the visible submissions made by constituents in response to the Issues Paper in 
which the majority (78 percent) supported the IASC’s proposal to incorporate only 
the successful efforts method into an international accounting standard for the 
extractive industries.  The “black box” metaphor facilitates consideration of this 
accounting standard setting process, providing a way to view the input and output at 
the same time as considering the influences that may infiltrate the process to affect 
the outcomes (Hodges and Mellett 2008).  While some of these influences will be 
visible, such as the comments letters, and their effects will be visible in the 
outcomes, the hidden or unseen influences must also be recognised as at least or 
perhaps more influential than the overt ones, and they are identifiable by their 
“footprints” left on the outcome (Hodges and Mellett 2008, 18).  In the case of the 
extractive industries, one explanation for the inaction of the IASB is the “invisible” 
influence of the major players in the standard setting process.  Analogous to the US 
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situation in the 1960s, the successful efforts versus full cost issue has now been 
raised and unresolved at the international level.   
 
A limitation of this research also presents an opportunity for further research.  A 
valuable extension of this research would be assessing the standard setting process 
as a participant observer.  While publicly available information has the advantage of 
offering relatively unproblematic access, gaining an “insider” perspective would 
add important insights to the research findings and overcome the limitation of 
inference that comes with this research.  Ultimately, presented in this paper is only 
a hypothesised version of what may have influenced the standard setting process.  
Until more in depth research is conducted and the black box actually penetrated, 
alternative hypotheses, such as the timing constraints and politics associated with 
the move to harmonisation, may also provide valid explanations for the outcome of 
this standard setting process.   
 
Other aspects of the extractive industries project may also be explored using the 
research approach and theoretical framework developed in this research.  A 
pertinent and timely issue for the extractive industries concerns accounting for 
removal and restoration expenses, which is an area of substantial accounting 
flexibility.  This area is also likely to be of interest to many and varied stakeholder 
groups including extractive industries companies, environmental groups, and non-
government organisations.  The black box concept could also be applied to other 
topics, such as intangibles or not-for-profit entities, both of which have been 
dropped from the active agenda of the IASB.  While the politicisation of accounting 
standard setting is widely acknowledged, the revelation that economically dominant 
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groups can covertly wield such power is a sobering one in the light of the 
worldwide promotion and adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards.     
                                                 
i A derivative of the successful efforts method, known as the Area of Interest method, was developed 
by Australian accounting standard setters in the 1970s.  This method allows costs to be capitalised 
when they relate to a successful venture, which is defined within a specific area of interest such as a 
single mine or a separate oil or gas field (Australian Accounting Standards Board, 1989).  
ii The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was formed in 2001.  Its predecessor, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee, was initially responsible for adding the extractive 
industries project to its agenda, 
iii Fortune 500 provides an annual list of the world’s largest companies according to revenue, profit, 
stockholders’ equity, assets, and number of employees. 
iv The Big 4 professional accounting firms include PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, KPMG, and Ernst & Young.  At the time the Issues Paper was first proposed, Andersen 
was another major international accounting firm that comprised part of the (then) Big 5. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Black Box of accounting standard setting
(Adapted from Hodges and Mellett, 2008)
Transparent 
process
Visible output 
consistent with 
visible input
Visible input 
(overt)
Unseen input 
(covert)
Visible input 
(overt)
The Black Box
Visible output 
NOT consistent 
with visible input
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Constituent Location Primary activity Preferred treatment
American Petroleum Institute US Industry lobby group Retention of choice
Anglo American Platinum Corporation Limited South Africa Mining company Successful efforts
Anglo American plc UK Mining company Successful efforts
Anglo Gold Limited South Africa Mining company Successful efforts
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants UK Professional body Successful efforts
Australasian Joint Ore Reserves Committee Australia Professional body Area of interest
Australian Gold Council Australia Professional body Area of interest
Balfour Holding Inc US Engineering firm No response   
BHP Limited (now BHP Billiton) Australia Mining company Area of interest
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Canada Professional body Retention of choice
Conoco Inc. US Petroleum company Successful efforts
Conoco Inc. US Petroleum company Successful efforts
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International Intl Accounting firm Successful efforts
Dr Geoff Frost/Ms Martine Hardy Australia Academic No response   
ENI Italy Petroleum company Successful efforts
Enterprise Oil plc UK Petroleum company Successful efforts
Esso Imperial Oil (subsidiary of ExxonMobil) Canada Petroleum company Retention of choice
Exxon Mobil Corporation US Petroleum company Successful efforts
FACPCE Argentina Professional body Successful efforts
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens Europe Professional body Successful efforts
Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer Sweden Professional body No response   
Gold Fields Limited South Africa Mining company Area of interest
Goldfields Limited Australia Mining company Area of interest
Group of 100 Australia Lobby group Successful efforts
Inst of Chartered Acc in England & Wales UK Professional body Retention of choice
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer Germany Professional body No response   
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia Australia Professional body Successful efforts
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan Pakistan Professional body Successful efforts
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Professional body Successful efforts
International Valuations Standards Committee UK Professional body No response   
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan Professional body No response   
John S Herold Inc US Engineering firm Successful efforts
Kenneth Arne Kazakhstan Individual Area of interest
Kerr-McGee North Sea (UK) Limited UK Petroleum company Retention of choice
KPMG International Intl Accounting firm Retention of choice
Melrose Resources Plc UK Petroleum company Retention of choice
Minerals Council of Australia Australia Industry lobby group Area of interest
Normandy Mining Limited Australia Mining company Successful efforts
Paladin Resources plc UK Petroleum company Retention of choice
PetroChina Company Limited China Petroleum company Successful efforts
PricewaterhouseCoopers South Africa Accounting firm Area of interest
PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia Accounting firm Retention of choice
Professor Terry Heazlewood Australia Academic Successful efforts
Rio Tinto UK Mining company Successful efforts
RWE - DEA AG Germany Utilities provider Successful efforts
RWE AG Germany Utilities provider Successful efforts
RWE Rheinbraun AG Germany Utilities provider Successful efforts
Sasol Mining Limited South Africa Mining company Successful efforts
South African Chamber of Mines South Africa Industry lobby group Area of interest
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa Professional body Area of interest
UK Oil Industry Accounting Committee UK Industry lobby group Retention of choice
Woodside Petroleum Ltd. Australia Petroleum company Successful efforts
52
46
10 (22%)
26 (56%)
10 (22%)
Table 1: Extractive industries constituents and preferred accounting treatment
Total respondents preferring area of interest
Total respondents
Total respondents to specific issue
Total respondents preferring retention of choice
Total respondents preferring successful efforts
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Table 2: Top 20 extractive industries companies according to industry, country, revenues and profit 
   
Fortune 
500 Rank Company Industry Country 
Revenues 
2005 Profits 2005
        ($ millions) ($ millions)
1 Exxon Mobil* Petroleum refining US 339,938 36,130
3 Royal Dutch/Shell Group Petroleum refining Netherlands 306,731 25,311
4 British Petroleum plc Petroleum refining UK 267,600 22,341
6 Chevron (now ChevronTexaco) Petroleum refining US 189,481 14,099
10 ConocoPhillips* (formerly Conoco Inc) Petroleum refining US 166,683 13,529
12 TOTAL Petroleum refining France 152,361 15,250
27 ENI* Petroleum refining Italy 92,603 10,920
39 China National Petroleum Petroleum refining China 83,557 12,950
64 E.ON Energy Germany 66,313 9,204
70 Statoil Petroleum refining Norway 61,033 4,769
77 Marathon Oil Petroleum refining US 58,958 3,032
86 Petrobrás Petroleum refining Brazil 56,324 10,344
105 RWE* Energy Germany 50,346 2,772
115 Lukoil Petroleum refining Russia 46,284 6,443
118 Nippon Oil Petroleum refining Japan 45,071 1,471
120 Petronas Petroleum refining Malaysia 44,280 11,565
153 Indian Oil Petroleum refining India 36,537 1,115
195 BHP Billiton plc* Mining, crude oil Australia 29,587 6,398
196 Anglo American plc* Mining, crude oil UK 29,434 3,521
Total 2,123,121 211,164
*  Responded to the Extractive Industries Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1   
 
Constituent Industry
Nature of annual 
contribution
Anderson Accounting US$1m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu* Accounting US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Ernst & Young Accounting US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
KPMG* Accounting US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
PricewaterhouseCoopers* Accounting US$1m - US$1.5m 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
AngloAmerican plc* Mining Supporter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
BHP Billiton plc* Mining Supporter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
British Petroleum plc Petroleum  Underwriter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Conoco Inc (now ConocoPhillips)* Petroleum  Supporter 2002
ENI* Petroleum  Supporter 1998 1999
E.ON Energy  Underwriter 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Exxon Mobil Corporation* Petroleum  Supporter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Petroleum  Supporter 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Rio Tinto* Mining Supporter 2003 2004 2006
RWE AG* Energy  Underwriter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Royal Dutch/Shell Group Petroleum  Underwriter 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Texaco (now ChevronTexaco) Petroleum  Supporter 1998 1999
TOTAL* Petroleum  Underwriter 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
* Responded to Extractive Industries Issues Paper, as indicated in Table 1
Year of contribution
Table 3: Constituents providing financial support to the IASC/IASB 1998-2006
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